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programming  assistance  was  provided  by  Chris  Ferrall.An essential  feature  of agricultural populations characterized by
incomplete  markets  is  the  interlinkage between production and consumption
decisions.  In particular, almost all of the  assets held by farmers
contribute directly to production and, to  the  extent that there are asset
markets, these can also  serve  as buffer stocks to  smooth consumption when
income  is  stochastically variable and credit markets  are incomplete.
Indeed, even financial assets, because of the  lack of synchronization
between payments and receipts within the crop-year, serve a production role
("working"  capital) quite  apart from their potential use as  an interyear
consumption-smoothing  instrument.  In settings  in which agricultural  incomes
are uncertain and there are credit market constraints,  therefore, a more
complete understanding of the  investment or  savings decisions of farmers
cannot be achieved without explicit recognition of the dual roles  of capital
stocks as productive  inputs and as buffer stocks.
The vast  literature focusing on risk-coping behavior  in rural, low-
income environments has  tended to  ignore either the consumption-smoothing
role  of assets or  the  determinants of  their levels.  Studies  of risk-
mitigating contractual arrangements such as  sharecropping, for example,
generally employ static models of risk-behavior which assume  the  absence of
capital markets  and the  exogeneity of asset holdings.  Empirical  studies
of  savings behavior in low-income countries  also do  not explicitly
characterize credit markets  and ignore  the direct effects of  asset
accumulations on income  levels.  Indeed, the  "permanent income" model, which
has been applied many times  to  agricultural populations  in low-income
countries  (e.g.,  Bhalla,  1980;  Wolpin,  1983;  Paxson, 1988),  assumes  the
absence  of borrowing constraints, and studies  incorporating this  framework
have treated income  as  exogenous  to  the process  of asset accumulation anddecumulation.  A recent model of savings behavior incorporating constraints
on borrowing (Deaton, 1989)  and purporting to be  relevant to  low-income
agricultural settings  emphasizes the  importance of assets  as buffer  stocks
but also  assumes  that income  is  exogenous  to  savings decisions.  All of
these  studies, however,  suggest a considerable degree of consumption-
smoothing behavior and the importance of this motivation for both asset
accumulation and formal contractual arrangements.
In  this paper we  formulate and estimate  a finite-horizon, structural
dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior that  incorporates income
uncertainty, constraints on borrowing and rental markets,  returns  to  farmer
experience, and the use of investment assets  to both generate income and to
smooth consumption.  The model yields  implications for the purchase and sale
of productive  assets and for income  levels that exhibit both "life-cycle"
and "high-frequency" consumption-smoothing patterns and is  fit to
longitudinal household data on farm profits, bullock stocks and pumpsets
from the  semi-arid tropics  of India.
The difficulties  of formulating estimable dynamic models of behavior
incorporating both uncertainty and borrowing constraints are well-known.
In recent years, however, advances  in methodology and computation have made
it  feasible to  estimate such models when the basic choice variables  are
discrete.2  Our model discretizes  assets by focusing on two  of  the most
important assets of farmers--bullocks and pumpsets--in the  environment we
study, South India.  The  "lumpiness" of these assets makes more  realistic
the use of the discrete dynamic framework for  studying investment and
savings behavior.  By estimating  the structural parameters underlying farmer
investment decisions, we can thus better assess  the consequences  of policy
changes  for farmer welfare.  As we show below, in contrast to all  otherproductive assets in India  (chiefly land and pumpsets),  bullock stocks,
which are  the principal source of motive power in that area of the world,
appear  to  turn over at relatively high rates and to  move inversely with
income realizations.  "Trimming the herd" through sales  thus  appears  to be an
important means of consumption-smoothing in the presence  of borrowing
constraints, with consequent implications for the  efficiency and volatility
of agricultural production.
In Section 1 of the  paper, we  set out a simple consumption-smoothing
stock adjustment model and test  its  implications based on aggregate and
individual  farmer time-series data on output, agricultural profits, and
bullock purchases and sales.  We show that both the aggregate and individual
farmer output data are characterized by positive serial  correlation, net of
fixed .effects  and time or age  trends, despite the absence  of any serial
correlation  in rainfall, consistent with the  use of productive  assets for
consumption-smoothing.  We  also show that bullock sales respond inversely  to
profit realizations, net of  initial-period stocks, suggesting the importance
of the  consumption-smoothing motivation  for these  investments.
Section 2 of the paper contains a description of  the structural model
and the estimation procedure employed and Section 3 reports  parameter
estimates  and both intra-  and extra-sample tests of  the predictive power of
the model.  In the  final section we use  the structural  estimates  to  assess
the  potential effects  on the  life-cycle accumulation and turnover  rate of
bullock stocks, purchases of pumpsets, agricultural profits, consumption  and
welfare associated with policies  that  (i) alter the prices of bullocks and
pumpsets,  through taxation and subsidization,  (ii)  provide assured sources
of  income to farmers  and (iii)  provide weather  insurance.  We  are able  to
use our estimates as  well to  compute  the price farmers are willing to payfor weather  insurance and compare  this  to  our estimates  of the actuarially-
fair cost of weather insurance.
Our estimates indicate  that farmers  are considerably averse  to  risk.
They also  suggest that there  is  substantial underinvestment in bullocks as  a
direct result of the  evident constraints  on farmers'  abilities to  smooth
consumption via the credit market.  As a consequence, our estimates  indicate
that increasing opportunities for earning non-risky incomes  for members of
farm households will  increase farm productivity, as would improvements  in
the  consumption loan market, if  feasible.  Our results also  indicate,
however, that  reductions  in the price of bullocks may lower welfare for
farmers and that  the gains  to  farmer welfare resulting from the
implementation of an actuarially-fair  (fully-funded) insurance  scheme are
quite  small.  Farmers  are evidently able  in part to  cope with the vagaries
of weather through informal means, which have almost completely substituted
for a formal weather insurance  scheme.
1.  The Data and Some Nonstylized Facts
a.  Stock adjustment and output auto-correlations
The environment we study, the semi-arid tropics of India from 1960
through 1985,  is  one in which there has been little or no  technical change.
If  the principle  source of uncertainty  in output, weather, is characterized
by a stationary i.i.d.  stochastic process, as  is  commonly assumed, then net
of trends  in population levels we would expect that output would also be
i.i.d. over time in this  environment.  This  is  the pervasive assumption in
the  literature on savings  in low-income countries.  Consider, however, a
simple linear stock adjustment model incorporating a consumption-smoothing
motive.  Output or  income Yt  in period t  is  a function of stocks Bt  held at
4the beginning of  the period and an i.i.d.  shock et:
(1)  Yt  - aBt +  ,  a >  0  .
Because of a desire  to  smooth consumption, farmers divest stocks when
previous-period output  is  low and accumulate stocks when it  is high, such
that
(2)  Bt  - 7Y1t-1  +  7 2Bt-' 1  71 >  0,
where we also  assume  that stocks may exhibit serial correlation net of
income.
Substituting (2) in (1) recursively, we  obtain
t-1
(3)  Y  - 71  +  12  t-i-  +  Et
Thus,  if productive  stocks respond positively to  income realizations
(71  >  0)  output exhibits  first-order positive serial correlation even if  et
is  i.i.d.;  second and higher-order  autocorrelations will occur as  a result
of net stock purchases adjusting to  current stocks, although these  effects
are  smaller the higher the order of  the  lag.  Of course,  relations  (1) and
(2) are unlikely to be  linear, but the implication of  at least a first-order
correlation in output is  robust  to  functional form.  Note  that the
prediction of a first-order positive serial correlation in output  is  in
contrast to  the negative autocorrelation implied by dynamic  soil depletion
models  (e.g.,  Eckstein, 1979),  although it  is  delivered by dynamic cost-of-
adjustment models  (Sargent, 1976).
We have two data sets describing the  semi-arid tropics.  The  first
provides an annual time-series  of rainfall  and a Laspeyres-weighted index ofaggregate farm output from 1960 to  1982  from five districts  in  the  Indian
semi-arid tropics  (Binswanger and Khandker, 1988).  The second data set is
from a longitudinal  survey of ten  "ICRISAT" villages located in  the  five
districts  (Singh et  al.,  1985).  We use data from three of  the villages, the
three that provide complete  information on assets, farm profits, and
demographic characteristics  for  farm households over  the greatest number of
years, 1975-1984.  Table 1 reports  fixed-effects autoregressions  of real
output value,  for lags  of orders one  and two,  estimated from each data set.
Both sets of results  indicate  that, net of fixed effects and of time or age
trends, farm output exhibits a strong degree of positive  serial correlation,
although higher-order partial correlations appear to be absent--the  Box-
Pierce statistic  applied to  the  residuals from the  aggregate time-series
data, based on 20-year lags,  indicates no autocorrelation once  the one-
period lag  in output is  accounted for  (X2 (20)-37.7),  although net of the
one-period lag  the hypothesis of no autocorrelation is  rejected
(X2 (20)-23.0).  The autocorrelation in output is  not evidently  the result of
any correlation in rainfall.  The estimated fixed-effects autocorrelations
for average daily rainfall obtained from  the district-level  data over the
23-year period are
(4)  rain  - .0455 • raint-1  -.00109  raint-2
(0.43)  (0.01)
where t-ratios are  in parentheses.  The coefficients on lagged rainfall are
neither individually nor jointly significant  (F(2,93) - 0.09).  The  auto-
correlation in agricultural output thus appears  to  reject models  employing
the simple permanent income framework for understanding the asset and
savings behavior of farmers  in credit-constrained environments.Table  1
Fixed Effects Estimates:  Tests  of First- and Second-Order
Serial Correlation in Real Value of Farm Output
Sample
Districts:  1960 -1982
a   Households:  1975-1984 b
Variable  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Output  (t-l)  .220  .245  .297  .163
S(2 .22 )c  (2.30)  (4.46)  (1.80)
Output (t-2)  - -.0505  - .0226
(0.48)  (0.25)
Year  -.102  -.111
(1.85)  (1.68)
Year squared  (x10-3 )  .795  .858
(2.04)  (1.85)
Age of farmer  - -380  849
(1.28)  (1.75)
Age  squared  - - -1.49  -3.48
(0.50)  (0.73)
F  51.3  40.7  11.2  7.61
Number  of  districts  5  5  - -
Number of farmers  - - 94  93
Number of ob-  105  100  794  604
servations
a.  Districts  in which ICRISAT villages are located:  Mahbubnagar,  Sholapur,
Akola,  Sabarkantha,  Raisen.
b.  Farm households in ICRISAT villages with ten years of  information for
farmers:  Aurepalle, Shirapur, Kanzara.
c.  Absolute values  of t-ratios  in parentheses.b.  Bullock stocks
In a stationary environment with perfect capital and contingent claims
markets and i.i.d. shocks, we would expect  to  observe  income  to be  i.i.d.
with no purchase or  sale of productive assets  (except for replacement) after
the initial period of life.  The most important production asset, land,
indeed exhibits  little turnover  in India  (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985).  In
contrast, bullock stocks, the most critical  factor of production in Indian
agriculture next to land, appear  to  exhibit high turnover rates.
Information from a national probability sample of farmers  in rural India in
the crop year 1970-71 indicates  that only 1.5 percent of farm households
sold any land while 9.5 percent sold livestock, the bulk of which were
bullocks, and less than one  tenth of one percent sold irrigation equipment
(National Council  of Applied Economic Research Additional Rural  Income
Survey, Third Round).  Moreover, in areas  in which crops were adversely
affected by weather conditions, the probability that a farmer sold livestock
2 was higher by 34 percent (X  - 5.13);  the incidence  of land sales, however,
was not  statistically significantly related to  transitory weather
conditions.
Bullock stocks in the ICRISAT villages also exhibit high turnover
rates:  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics  for  the  farmers  in the  three
villages, classified by the three farm size  strata used in the  ICRISAT
sampling frame.  As indicated in the  table, for  the  top  two land classes,
over 86  percent of farmers bought or sold bullocks over  the ten-year  survey
period, with up to  almost a  third of all  the household-year observations  for
the largest land class characterized by at least one bullock purchase or
sale.  In contrast, less  than 2.5 percent of observations were characterized
by a pump purchase  for any land class.Table  2
Characteristics  of Farmers, by Land Class
Small  Medium  Large
Mean land size  (hectares)  1.78  3.45  10.3
Standard deviation of  land size  0.94  1.43  6.77
Mean farm profits  (1983 rupees)  1431  2508  9706
Mean household food consumption  2541  2609  3772
(1983 rupees)
Mean age  46.9  48.7  47.6
Mean number of bullocks owned  0.49  0.94  2.72
Percent of all sample years  in which  14.6  22.5  32.7
bullocks are bought or sold
Percent of  farmers ever buying or  50.0  88.8  86.7
selling bullocks during survey period
Percent of farmers ever owning a pump  13.8  31.0  57.1
Percent of all  sample years in which a  1.1  2.3  2.3
pump  is  purchased
Percent  of  farmers  purchasing  a  pump  9.4  18.2  16.7
during survey period
Number of observations  (farmer-years)  264  263  261
Number of farmers  32  33  30
Source:  ICRISAT Village Studies,  1975-1984:  Aurepalle,  Shirapur, and
Kanzara villages.The villages  also do not appear  to be  closed economies with respect to
bullock stocks,  as  indicated in Figure  1, which displays  the  movements  in
average bullock stocks over  time for  the  same farmers.  While bullock stocks
can increase due  to breeding in a closed economy, they cannot decrease
except due to  death, and too  few deaths of bullocks occurred during the
survey period  to account  for the  downward swings in bullock stocks  (all
deaths  are  "natural" in this  economy).  However, some of the movements
depicted in Figure 1 could reflect sampling error and bullock deaths appear
to be underreported.
Figure 2 plots the average  stocks of bullocks by farmer's  age.  In
contrast to Figure 1, high-frequency fluctuations are more  likely to be
sampling noise;  the overall pattern, however, appears  to suggest that  there
is a life-cycle component  to bullock accumulation.  A simple regression of
bullock stocks  on a linear-quadratic  function of age  indicates  that bullock
stocks peak at age 45.  In contrast to  the year-to-year variability in
bullock stocks,  ownership of pumpsets merely exhibits  an upward drift over
the sample period, as  shown in Figure  3.  And Figure  4 suggests  that pumpset
ownership increases more or less  linearly with age.
The ownership of bullock stocks  is  critical for farmers'  capabilities
to produce  income.  The importance of animal traction in Indian agriculture
compared to  other areas  of the world is well known, and reflects  the unique
agroclimatic conditions of the country.3  In particular,  the monsoon
economy,  in which a long, hot dry period  is  followed by intensive rainfall,
requires a  substantial input of motive power in a short period of  time  to
produce even a single crop.  Moreover, the  soil, hardened and dried during
the non-rainy season, must be tilled in the  generally short period of  time
between the onset of monsoon showers  (which are  required to  render the  soilcu
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0 3tillable)  and the  optimal sowing date.  Not only  is  the use  of bullocks
necessary for production in the  semi-arid tropics but the  uncertainty of the
monsoon onset date,  the  short period of time during which tillage  and sowing
operations  take place, and the high positive covariance  in the  timing of  the
demand for animal  traction make  it  almost  impossible  for farmers  to  rely on
a bullock rental market.  Ownership of work animals  is  thus required to
insure  the  timeliness of pre-harvest farm operations.
That there  is  turnover in bullock stocks  does not necessarily mean that
bullocks  are used to  smooth consumption.  To see  if purchases  (sales) of
bullocks respond positively  (negatively) to  income,  as would appear  to be
implied by a consumption-smoothing model, we estimated a version of equation
(2) from the ICRISAT data, in which we also  incorporate  information on
whether  the farmer owned a pump.  Because of  the discreteness of the bullock
variable, we ordered the net purchases of bullocks  into seven discrete
categories, the  lowest being the sale.of  three or more bullocks  (in a year)
and the highest  the purchase of  three or more bullocks.
The maximum-likelihood ordered probit estimates of net bullock sales
are presented in the  first column of Table  3.  These  estimates  indicate that
net purchases  are significantly more  likely to  occur when  income  is  high
than when income  is  low, consistent with what appears  to  be an  implication
of  a consumption-smoothing motive.  In columns  two  and three  of  the  table we
confirm that not only does  the probability of a purchase  rise with income,
but the probability of a sale declines;  there  is  divestment when income  is
low.  Finally, in the last column of Table 3, we report maximum-likelihood
probit estimates for the purchase of pump, based on a sample  of farmer-
observations  in which a pump  is not already owned.  Not surprisingly,  the
probability of a pump purchase rises  as well with income,  though there  is  noTable 3
Estimates of Approximations  to  Farmer Decision Rules:  Net Additions,
Gross Additions and Divestments  of Bullocks  and Purchases  of Pumps  in Crop-Year
Net Additions  Addition of  Divestment of Purchase
Variable/  of Bullocks  Bullocks  Bullocks  of Pump
Estimation Procedure  Ordered Probit  Probit  Probit  Probitc
Profits  (xl0 4 )  .882  .824  -.645  .913
(9 .80 )a   (5.42)  (4.17)  (2.55)
Number of bullocks  at  -.385  -.246  .376  .324
beginning of year less  (13.6)  (4.71)  (7.55)  (2.76)
bullock deaths  in year
Whether own a pump at  -.271  -.272  .260
beginning of year  (2.41)  (1.66)  (1.70)
Small  farm  -.0627  -.354  -3.50  .424
(0.41)  (1.92)  (1.84)  (0.84)
Medium farm  .0062  -.106  -.166  .657
(0.05)  (0.63)  (1.02)  (1.48)
Age of farmer  .0238  -.0054  -.0527  -.0385
(1.01)  (0.18)  (1.72)  (0.51)
Age of farmer squared  -.230  .0723  .524  .112
(x10"-)  (1.01)  (0.24)  (1.79)  (0.14)
2 (d.f.)b  123.8(9)  48.6(9)  107.9(9)  39.1(8)
n  788  788  788  545
a.  Absolute values of asymptotic  t-ratios  in parentheses  in column.
b.  Specification  includes three dummy variables corresponding to  villages in
sample.
c.  Sample of farmers without a pump.divestment.
The  results  in Table  3 also  indicate  that  the  current  level of own
stocks, net of  income, influence negatively the probability of a subsequent
purchase, a result which suggests  that  there is  some  targeting of  stock
levels.  Clearly  to understand more fully bullock investment behavior, more
than just the  ad hoc "model" of  equations  (1) through  (3) is  required, at
the very least because  the determination of income  needs  to be modeled,
inclusive of the  technology of production and the value  (cost) of the
assets.
2.  The Structural Model and Estimation Strategy
a.  The model
To understand more fully  the dynamics  of bullock stock adjustment
behavior we  formulate a structural  dynamic model.  There  are a number of
salient features  of the agricultural environment that we incorporate.  The
most important  elements of  the model are:  (i) farmers wish  to  smooth their
consumption, (ii)  bullocks contribute to  agricultural output and income,
(iii)  output and income are  stochastic, resulting from the  existence  of both
farmer-specific and aggregate  (weather) shocks,  and (iv) bullocks  can be
purchased and sold.  The partiability of  inheritance  in the  Indian context,
in which the death of  the household head results  in the  transfer of a share
of family assets to  each male heir, each  of whom subsequently resides  in a
separate household, also  suggests  that a finite-horizon model  is  relevant,
although one  incorporating  a bequest motive.  The  finiteness of  life  is  one
possible  reason why bullock stocks  exhibit an age-pattern, as  seen in  Figure
2.  However, we  also  incorporate in the model  the possibility  that
agricultural productivity depends on farmer age,  reflecting the  returns  to
farming experience  (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985).
10The  farmer  is  assumed to maximize  the present value of expected
lifetime utility over  a finite horizon  inclusive of bequests.  Utility at
any age t, u(Ct-Cmin),  depends on the consumption of a single non-storable
aggregate commodity, Ct , above minimum subsistence consumption, Cmin.  The
farmer owns a fixed amount of land, A, which can neither be  divested nor
added to,  but can accumulate animals used in production  (bullocks) through
purchases and/or via self-production.  The  farmer can also purchase a pump
for crop production, which, unlike bullocks, has no  resale value.  The
utility from bequests  at the  last age,  C(A,BT++nT+T++nT+nT-1,MT+1),  depends
on land owned (which is  automatically transferred),  the sum of  the  stock of
adult bullocks, BT+1 ,  and of  young bullocks  (calves) at each of their first
three years of life,  where nT+i  is  a newborn calf, nT is  a one-year old, and
nT-I  a two-year old, and on the ownership of a pump, MT+1.  Bullocks, calves
and pumps are  the only intergenerationally transferable assets which are




(5)  E0   tu(Ct-Cmin)  +  9(BT+i +  E  nj,  MT+1)
j-T-1
t-O
where EO  is  the expectations operator given the  information set at  the  age
of inheritance, and 6  is  the  subjective  discount factor.
The  farmer's  income is  derived from crop production, which is  a two-
stage process which we denote as  planting and harvesting.  In  the planting
stage, the  stock of bullocks  (including net purchases  from previous-period
profits) and the fixed amount of land are combined with variable  inputs  such
as  seeds,  fertilizers, and labor.  The crop  available for harvesting, i.e.,
11the  potential yield from the planting stage,  depends  as well on the
realization of a stochastic  shock.  The harvesting  stage uses  only variable
inputs,  primarily labor.  All variable  inputs are paid out of current period
profits.  We assume that variable planting input decisions  are made prior  to
the  realization of the  shock, while harvest input decisions occur after the
realization.
Farm profits  at t are  thus given by
(6)  pt(Bt,M ,A,Z  ,  hvt)  - EtzZt  - mB
where Bte(O,1,...,B) is  the  adult bullock stock, Mte(O,1) is  the  ownership
of a pump, A is  land size,  Z  t  and  h are variable  input vectors used in
the planting and harvesting stages  respectively, m is  the maintenance cost
per bullock, vt is  the  random shock to production, composed of a farmer-
specific shock and an independent shock common to  all  farmers  in an
environment, py  is  the  product price, and Rt  is  the vector of variable
input prices.  We subscript the production function to  allow for  the
possibility  that farm productivity  is  age-dependent.
While the  farmer can accumulate and divest assets  (bullocks), we  assume
that he cannot borrow.  Any  intertemporal stochastic consumption model with
borrowing constraints must deal with the  problem that income  may fall short
of minimum consumption even when all  assets have been divested.  This  is
particularly true in our case because agricultural profits  are not
infrequently very low;  ten percent of the  farmer-year observations among
small-  and medium-size  farmers  in our sample  are characterized by profits  of
200  rupees or  less.  We employ the  assumption that the  farmer must sell his
animals  to  maintain minimum consumption in each period.  If minimum
12consumption cannot be achieved with full divestiture, then we assume that
consumption equals minimum consumption.  Thus, we assume that  the  farmer has
a form of disaster insurance.  One example  is  transfers  from non-resident
family members, which have been shown to be important  in the environment we
are studying (Rosenzweig, 1988;  Rosenzweig and Stark,  1989;  Caldwell et al.
1986)  and in other low-income environments  (Lucas and Stark, 1985).
Because  we assume that there are no opportunities  to borrow and the
only asset that can be sold is bullocks,  consumption must equal farm profits
net of the purchase or sale of adult bullocks,  the purchase cost of a pump
if one  is  purchased, and the  breeding cost of a calf if one  is bred as  long
as  the  consumption  minimum  is  met.  That  is,
(7)  Ct - t  - pbbt+  - pmt+-  cnt+l  Cmin
Ct - Cmin if  It + pbt  Cmin ,
where pb  pm,  and c are  the real price of an adult bullock, the real price
of a pump,  and the real  cost of breeding respectively;  bt+1  is  the  net
number of adult bullocks purchased, with neg(bt+l)  _  Btif bt+1  < 0;  mt+1
indicates  the purchase of  a pump, and nt+1  indicates  the breeding of a calf.
Although bullocks  and/or pump transactions  as well as breeding take place at
t, they have no effect on profits and thus  decisions  until t+l,  which
accounts for the  subscript convention  in (7).
The bullock stock evolves according to
(8)  Bt - Btl1  +  bt +  nt- 3  - dt_.
The bullock stock at  t equals  the  stock in the previous period plus net
purchases and the number of calves born three periods before  less bullock
deaths  during the period.  For simplicity, we assume  that only one birth and
only one  death can occur in any period regardless of the  size  of the bullock
13stock.  The probability that an adult bullock dies  is qd.  The  equation of
motion for pump ownership  is
(9)  Mt - Mt 1  + mt
where Mt , mt - (0,1)  and mt - 0 if Mt-l  =  1.  Thus,  only one pump can be
purchased and owned.
At the end of period t the  farmer must decide, prior to  the realization
of next period's  production shock vt+I,  how many bullocks  to buy or sell
(bt+1 ),  whether or not  to breed a bullock  (to be born in the next period,
nt+l),  whether or not  to buy a pump  (if  one  is not already owned, mt+l) and
how much of  each  planting variable input  ZP+  to  purchase.  After  the t+l  ase.1Ater  th
realization of the  shock, variable harvest  inputs  zht+  are purchased.
Solving the optimization problem described above for  all of these choice
variables  is  not tractable  in the  context of  estimation, i.e.,  where the
problem must be  solved repeatedly at alternative parameter values.  If there
were no planting-stage  (pre-shock) variable inputs, then variable input
decisions could be  separated out  from the  dynamic problem, because post-
shock harvesting inputs would be allocated to maximize  single-period
profits.  A  (restricted) profit function conditional on  stocks held at  the
beginning of the  period could then be estimated to  retrieve  the technology
parameters.  It  is  sufficient for  separability that planting variable  inputs
are used in fixed proportions to  the  fixed input land and/or to  the
predetermined inputs  (bullocks, pump).  We  also assume  that all variable
input prices and the product price are completely determined by an average
village-level  output shock  (contained in v  in equation  (6)).  Thus  there is
uncertainty, of  a particular form, about output, variable  input prices and
product price.  The restricted or conditional profit function, under these
14assumptions, takes  the  form
(10)  ft - Ht(Bt,Mt,L,wt+et)
where vt =  wt+et  is  decomposed into village-level  (weather, wt)  and farmer-
level  time-varying  (et)  shocks.
The  optimization  problem  can  be  solved  numerically  by  backwards
recursion using Bellman's  equation.  Specifically, expected lifetime utility
is  given  by
(11)  Vt(Bt,dt,Mt,ntt,ntl-2,wt,  t )
- max  {  u(nt(Bt,Mt,L,wt,et)  - pbbt+
(bt+1 ,nt+1 ,mt+ 1  )  t+l  - cnt+
- Pmmt+l  - cnt+1)
+  SEmax(Vt+1 (Bt+bt+1 +nt-2 -dt,  dt+1 ,  Mt+mt+l,
nt+l,nt,nt-1,wt+1 ,et+ 1
)  }
if  t  <  T
VT(BT,dTMT,  nT,nT-,nT-2,wT,e  T)
- max  u((IT(BTMT,L,wTT) - pbbT+
(bT+l,nT+l,mT+1  P  -
- pmMT+1  - cnT+1)
+  P(BT+bT+l+nT-2-dT,  nT+lIn  ,nT-1  nT,  I  T+lm  )
The  expectations  operator  in  (11)  is  taken  over  the  joint  distribution  of  d,
w  and  e which  is  known  by  the  farmer.
Implementation  of  the  model  for  estimation  requires  the  specification
of  functional  forms  for  the  utility  function,  the  bequest  function  and  the
15profit function, and assumptions about  the joint density of d, w and e.  The
per-period utility function  is assumed  to  be of  the constant relative  risk
aversion type, namely
1
(12)  u(Ct)  - (Ct-Cmin)
1-7
where  is  the relative  risk aversion parameter.  The bequest  function is
assumed to  depend on expected profits of the next generation in its  first
period after inheritance plus bullock wealth,
(13)  3(*)  - (E(T+lIC>Cmin)  + pbBT+)
The profit function for a given land class  is
B  B
(14)  it  - HIO  +  1  lljDtj  +  l2Mt  +  Z  I3jDtjMt  +  lI 4wt  +  ~  et
j-o  j-0
where Dtj  - 1 if the  stock of bullocks at  time t is j and zero  otherwise.
Weather  is  assumed for tractability  to be described by a serially
uncorrelated two-point  distribution; bad weather occurs with probability q,
and good weather with probability l-q,.  Weather and bullock mortality are
independently distributed from each other and from  the  idiosyncratic shock,
e.  The  latter  is  assumed to be  i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance
2
E
Although wt, dt,  and e. are  all random variables,  only et  is  assumed to
be  unobservable  to  the researcher.  The solution of  the model yields  a
vector of critical values of  E  at  each t which divides  the real  line into
regions within which particular choices  are optimal  for each  set of values
of the  state space.  These critical values form  the basis of  the estimation.
16The solution method is similar  to  that described in Wolpin  (1984).
b.  The  likelihood function
The assumption of quasi-separability permits us  to  follow a two-step
estimation procedure;  we first estimate  the conditional or restricted profit
function parameters and then estimate  the remaining parameters  of the
optimization model.  As  a consequence, we can estimate  the  flexible  form of
the profit function given by  (14),  which  is not parsimonious  in parameters.
We  treat 7,  Cmin,  the profit variance,  the breeding price, and the  pump
price as  estimable parameters.  Although we obtain an estimate of the profit
variance  from the profit function estimates, we  assume that profits are
measured with error.
What we observe  for an individual farmer  is  a sequence of pump and
bullock stocks beginning at  some initial age,  the age distribution of calves
at  the farmer's  initial age,  a sequence of bullock deaths and a sequence of
weather states.  In addition, we  (and the  farmers) are assumed to know qd'
q,,  and pb.  The bullock price  is  treated as  data because we have  a more
reliable  estimate of  its value than we do  for the pump price or  the breeding
cost both of which we estimate as  parameters.  Regressions of  the actual
village-level prices of bullocks on weather outcomes  indicated that there
was no statistically significant association between village-level weather
shocks,  obtained from the profit  function estimates described below, and
bullock prices.  The bullock price  is  thus fixed at  its  sample mean value
(in 1983 rupees),  at 992  rupees.
Because we do not have reliable  data on breeding subsequent to  the
initial age, we need to  calculate the  following probability statement for
each farmer:
17(15)  Pr(B1, MiB 2 , M 2 1 2 ,Br, r IMBo,MO,n0,n.l,n-2 )
- 2  . . 2  Pr(B1,M l n I 22 , B 2 , M 2 ,n 2  *  BrM r ,n r b O M O n 0O n -l n -2 )
n1  n 2   n r
where  the  zero  subscript  refers  to  the  initial  age,  and  r  is  the  number  of
years  of  data  available  for  the  farmer.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  initial
age  is  not  necessarily  the  first  age  at  which  the  farmer  is  a  decision-
maker.  Thus,  the initial condition is  not exogenous.  However, because of
the  i.i.d. assumption concerning et,  the  initial condition is  statistically
independent  of  future  decisions.  If  et  was  serially  correlated  or  there  was
farmer-specific  unobserved  heterogeneity,  the  estimation  method  would
require modification.
Equation  (15)  can  be  rewritten  as  a  product  of  conditional  probabilities,
namely as
(16)  Z  . . E Pr(Br,Mr,nrlBr-,Mr.,nr
2 ,nr- 3 )
n I   n7
SPr(B-1,Mr-1,n r -1I r -2,r- 2 ,nr- 2 ,nr-3,n r -4 )
. .......  . .Pr(B 1 ,M1,nj  Bo,Mo,no,n,n -2 ).
Each  of  these  conditional  probabilities  depends  on  the  cutoff  values  of
the  e's  derived  from  the  dynamic  program,  which  are  themselves  functions  of
the  parameters  we  wish  to  estimate.  Thus,  the  likelihood  function  over  I
farmers  is
2  m (17)  L(7,Cminappcjdata)
I
n  2  . . . E  Pr(B 1 ,M1 ,nl,..,Br  ,M r  ,nr  IBo,Mon0o,n-  ,n 2 )
i=1  n 1   nr   i  i  i
i
Maximum  likelihood  estimates  are  obtained  by  iterating  between  the  dynamic
18program which solves  for the  cutoffs and the likelihood maximization
routine.
3.  Results
a.  Parameter estimates
As  discussed above, we  follow a two-step estimation strategy as a means
of reducing the  scale of the estimation problem.  The first-step profit
function estimates  corresponding to equation (14) are presented in Table 4
for each of  three land classes defined in the  ICRISAT data set.  The first-
column estimates  for each land class  are within-village estimates that
include year dummies.  The second column reports a restricted version that
combines  year effects  into a dichotomous variable representing good and bad
weather states  (see notes  to Table 4) and that combines village effects when
statistically appropriate.  In addition to  the profit determinants  shown in
equation  (14)  the age of the farmer is  included to  capture age-related
changes  in productivity.
The estimates in Table 4 provide  information on the profit-maximizing
level of bullocks  and pump ownership status.  With respect to  the  latter,  it
is  clearly optimal in all land classes  to  own a pump regardless  of the  size
of the bullock stock.  For example,  a medium size  farmer would augment
annual profits by  2122 rupees by purchasing and installing a pump, an 85
percent  increase at  the mean profit level.  Despite  this  high return, as
seen in Table 2 only 31 percent of  the families  in this  land class ever
owned a pump, and over the ten-year period only 18  percent purchased a pump.
The profit-maximizing level of bullocks varies by land size.  For
small-size farmers  it  is  optimal  to  own two bullocks  if the  farmer does not
own a pump and one bullock if the  farmer does  own a pump.  For medium-size
19Table  4
Profit  Function Parameter Estimates by Land CLass
Small  Medium  LargeC
Fixed-Effects  Fixed-Effects  Fixed-Effects








Pump  1786  1677
(4.02)e  (3.83)
Number of butlocks x  pump
1  1781  2061
(2.45)  (2.95)
2  132  356
(0.22)  (0.63)




































































































































72a. Year effects are combined to form a  dichotomous variable representing
"good"  and  "bad" profit  years  based  on  the  year-effect  estimates.  Bad
years  were  1980  and  1981  for  Aurepalle;  1977  for  Shirapur,  and  1980  and
1982  for Kanzara.  The hypothesis that  the good-bad differential  in
profits was  identical  across villages was not  rejected.  Profit  levels,
net of  stocks, were statistically significantly lower in  Aurepalle
village, however.
b. Year effects are  treated similarly as described in  (a)  above.  Bad
years were 1975,  1976, 1980 and 1981  for Aurepalle;  1977, 1978 and  1983
for Shirapur, and 1977, 1978 and 1979 for Kanzara.  The  joint hypothesis
that the good-bad profit  differential and profit  levels, net of  stocks,
were identical across villages was not  rejected.  Therefore, the
restricted model  includes no village-specific effects.
c. Sample  includes only large  farms  in  Shirapur village.
d. Year effects were treated similarly as  in  (a)  above.  In  1980 profits,
net of  stocks, were significantly  lower.
e. Absolute value of t-ratios in  parentheses.
f. No  observations  in  cell.farmers  it  is  optimal to  own  two bullocks and for large  farmers four
bullocks, in each case regardless of pump ownership.  As  seen  in Table 2,
however, the average number of bullocks  owned is  only 0.49  for small
farmers,  0.94 for medium farmers and 2.72  for large farmers,  all of which
fall substantially short of  the  respective profit-maximizing  levels.  Note
also  that the existence of  substantial returns to bullock ownership  is
consistent with the  conventional wisdom that the bullock rental market, a
market we assume to  be absent  in estimating the  full dynamic model, cannot
adequately provide farmers with animal traction when they most need it.
The effect of bad weather on profits  is  761 rupees for  small-size
farmers, 1294 rupees  for medium-size  farmers,  and 1433 for  large-size
farmers.  The profit loss  in bad weather  is  particularly large  for the
small-  and medium-size  farmers relative  to  average profits.  Table 4 also
reveals a statistically discernible age-pattern in profits  for medium- and
large-size farmers.  In both cases profits  first rise with age, peak at
approximately age 45,  and then decline.  Although we stress an uncertainty
motive for savings,  the  existence of a profit-age  relationship reveals  the
potential for a life-cycle smoothing motive as  well.  Our model incorporates
both motives.
Given the estimated profit function parameters,  the  rest of  the model's
parameters can be  estimated using the bullock and pump  data as  described in
the previous section.  It  is  important to  note  that the  estimation procedure
requires  that the dynamic program be solved separately for farmers whose
returns  to  investments or whose prospects of weather  shocks differ.  To
minimize  the computational burden, we estimated  the  remaining parameters of
the model only using observations on medium-size  farmers.  As  shown in Table
2, medium-size  farmers are  the  most homogenous  in actual land size  so  that
20the marginal profitability of an additional bullock and of pump ownership is
least  likely  for  this  group  to  reflect  unmeasured  land-  size  effects.
Moreover, village effects  are completely absent for  the medium-size group.
Indeed, for the  large-size group not only do  average profits net of inputs
differ across the  three villages but bad weather  effects also  differ by
village.  For this reason we obtained and reported  in Table 4 profit
function estimates  for only a single village  (Shirapur),  the  one with the
least land size variation within the large-size  farms.  However, even if
large farmers were homogeneous, we believe the  model may not be as
appropriate to  this relatively wealthy class of  farmers, who appear to
exhibit less risk-averse behavior  (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1989).  We
test this hypothesis below.  The  cost of restricting the estimation to  the
class of medium-size farmers  in the three villages is  reduced sample  size
and a concomitant loss  in estimation precision.  An offsetting advantage  is
the ability to perform extra-sample tests of the model with the small- and
large-farm class  data.
An important limitation of  the data is  that we could not estimate
profits  for all possible combinations of bullocks for each land class.  For
the middle-level  farmers,  in particular,  in only two periods were any
farmers holding as many as  three bullocks and none were holding four or
more.  It was  thus not possible to  determine with any precision the profit
consequences of holding more than two bullocks  for these  farmers.  Because
in each period the farmer must consider all  feasible alternatives  and their
consequences, the  absence of information on the profitability of  owning more
than two bullocks
led us  to  restrict B  to  be  two.  Thus,  farmers were assumed  to place a zero
probability of owning more  than two bullocks  and, of course, could not hold
21more than two.  To  ascertain if  this restriction had serious consequences
for  our estimates, we searched for  the  minimum reduction in profits  that
would make  the probability of actually holding  three bullocks zero  if
farmers were free  to  do  so,  given our parameter estimates.  We  found that
this  amount was  600 rupees, which corresponds closely to  the average annual
maintenance costs of a bullock.  We do not think, therefore, that  this
restriction  importantly affects our results  (recall that medium-size  farmers
on average hold less  than one bullock).
Table 5 reports  the maximum-likelihood estimates  of the preference
function, price and profit variance parameters.  The relative risk aversion
parameter is  estimated to be 0.90 which  implies  that there exists  a strong
motive for consumption smoothing among these farmers.  The estimated
consumption minimum is  2584 rupees which appears somewhat high relative both
to  average profits and average food consumption as  shown in Table 2.  It is
noteworthy, however,  that average  food consumption  is almost identical  in
small-  and medium-size  farm households, which  is consistent with a high
consumption floor.  The  price of a pump  is  estimated to be 6007 rupees  and
the breeding price 717  rupees.  The  estimated standard deviation in profits
(net of weather  effects)  is  2267  rupees which  is  almost identical  to  the
regression estimate,  implying that profits are measured quite accurately.
b.  Tests  of fit
To  assess  the validity of the model we performed a number of  goodness-
of-fit tests both for the  sample of medium-size farmers from which the
estimates were obtained and the  small- and large-size  farmers who are
presumed to  face  the  same markets and to  have the  same preferences.  Table  6
provides chi-square goodness-of-fit statistics  for medium-size  farmers by
year based on the actual stock of bullocks owned in the previous year.  As
22Table  5
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates a
Parameter  7  Cmi  c  b  p.  a
Estimate  .904  2584  717  6007  2267
a.  The discount factor 6  is  set at  .95.  The probability of bad weather q,
is  .3, the probability of bullock mortality is  .15,  and the purchase
(and sale) price of a bullock is  992 rupees (1983  rupees),  the sample
average over all bullock transactions.
b.  The breeding price was constrained to be less  than the price of an adult
bullock.
c.  The profit variance was constrained to be less  than the estimate
obtained from the  regression function reported in Table 4, 2269.Table  6
Within-Sample Goodness-of-Fit Tests:  Distribution of Medium-Size  Farms
by Year and Bullock Stocka
No  Bullocks  One Bullock  Two Bullocks
Year  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  2
76  14  14  1  2.7  9  7.3  1.42
77  13  13.6  3  2.5  8  7.9  0.14
78  11  14.2  1  2.4  12  7.4  4.41
79  13  12.9  1  2.3  10  8.9  0.84
80  11  11.7  3  2.5  10  9.9  0.16
81  12  11.3  2  3.0  10  9.7  0.37
82  11  11.7  2  2.7  11  9.6  0.44
83  12  10.5  3  2.8  9  10.6  0.47
84  14  12.9  1  2.8  9  8.4  1.27
a.
b.
Sample includes only farmers with ten years  of  information;  n=216.
X2 ( 2 )-5.99  at  .05  significance  level.seen in that  table although there  is  a tendency to underpredict the
ownership of  two bullocks and overpredict the absence  of any bullocks, none
of the chi-square statistics  exceed the  critical value at  the  five  percent
level.  We cannot reject,  for any year, the hypothesis that  the distribution
of bullock stocks predicted by our model  is  identical  to  the actual
distribution.
A more stringent within-sample test  is provided in Table 7.  In  that
table predicted bullock stocks in all years are based only on information on
the initial  (1975) stock.  Although the  fit is  generally worse  than that
obtained using period-by-period information,  as  expected, in only one year
does  the chi-square statistic  imply rejection of the model.  However, a
model which predicted that bullock stocks would not change over time
generally has lower chi-square statistics.  The data do not contain enough
year-to-year variation in bullock stocks  to distinguish between models which
predict (realistically) only small year to year changes.
Another test is  to examine the conformity of  the predicted age pattern
of bullock stocks  to  the actual pattern.  The  actual life-cycle pattern of
bullock ownership, as already discussed, has approximately an inverted u-
shape.  As Table 8 shows,  the predicted pattern has  a similar  shape.
However,  the number of farmers owning two bullocks  is  severely
underestimated for  the 31-40 and 41-50 age groups,with  the associated  chi-
square statistics exceeding  the critical value.
The extra-sample goodness-of-fit tests using the  small-size farmers are
shown in Tables  9  and 10 based on actual lagged and initial  (1975) bullock
stocks respectively.  In  the  former,  the  fit test rejects  the model in only
two of the years, while  in  the  latter rejection occurs  in six  of the  years,
with the  fit much worse  in the  later years.  To ascertain  if the model
23Table  7
Within-Sample Goodness-of-Fit Tests Based on Initial Stocks Only:
Distribution of Medium-Size Farms by Year and Bullock Stocka
No Bullocks  One Bullock  Two Bullocks  2b
Year  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  x
75(initial  15  - 1  - 8
stocks)
76  14  13.8  1  2.8  9  7.4  1.5
77  13  14.1  3  2.8  8  7.1  0.21
78  11  15.3  1  2.5  12  6.1  7.7
79  13  15.9  1  2.4  10  5.7  4.6
80  11  13.7  3  2.6  10  7.6  1.4
81  12  13.6  2  2.5  10  7.9  0.86
82  11  13.3  2  2.6  11  8.1  1.6
83  12  12.5  3  2.5  9  9.0  0.13
84  14  13.8  1  2.4  9  7.8  0.46
Sample  includes only farmers with ten
S2(2)=5.99  at  .05  significance level.
years  of information;  n-216. a.
b.Table  8
Within-Sample Goodness-of-Fit Tests  Based on 1975 Initial  Stocks Only:
Distribution of Medium-Size Farms by Age-Group  and Bullock Stocka
No Bullocks  One Bullock  Two Bullocks  b
Age Group  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  X
21-30  14  14.7  1  2.1  6  4.1  1.5
(. 67 )b  (.70)  (.05)  (.10)  (.28)  (.20)
31-40  14  18.1  0  3.7  17  9.1  11.4
(.45)  (.55)  (.00)  (.12)  (.55)  (.29)
41-50  27  38.3  4  8.1  42  26.6  14.2
(.38)  (.52)  (.05)  (.11)  (.58)  (.36)
51-60  37  35.4  6  6.2  13  14.3  0.19
(.66)  (.63)  (.11)  (.11)  (.23)  (.26)
61-70  19  19.6  6  2.9  10  12.5  3.19
(.54)  (.56)  (.17)  (.08)  (.29)  (.36)
a.  Sample includes  only farmers with ten years of information;  n-216.
b.  Proportion of farms  in category  in parentheses.Table  9
Extra-Sample Goodness-of-Fit Tests:  Distribution of Small-Size Farms
by  Year  and  Bullock  Stock
No Bullocks  One Bullock  Two  Bullocks
2a
Year  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  X
76  22  22.9  3  3.4  4  2.6  0.20
77  23  24.1  1  3.9  5  1.0  0.30
78  23  24.0  0  3.5  6  1.5  0.24
79  21  23.2  3  4.1  5  1.6  1.14
80  16  21.7  5  3.5  6  1.7  7.97
81  15  21.0  4  3.7  8  2.3  7.71
82  16  17.1  6  4.7  4  4.2  0.21
83  15  19  6  3.5  5  3.5  3.13
84  18  17.8  1  3.5  7  4.7  0.01
a.  One and two-bullock categories  aggregated to  compute  the  test
statistics.  Critical x  (1)-3.84 at  .05 significance level.Table  10
Extra-Sample Goodness-of-Fit Tests Based on 1975  Initial Stocks Only:
Distribution of Small-Size Farms by Year and Bullock Stock
No Bullocks  One Bullock  Two Bullocks
2a
Year  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted  X
75(initial)  23  - 1  - 5-
76  22  23.0  3  3.5  4  2.6  0.18
77  23  24.0  1  3.3  5  1.7  0.24
78  23  25.2  0  2.9  6  0.9  1.47
79  21  25.1  3  3.0  5  0.9  4.98
80  16  23.4  5  2.9  6  0.7  17.6
81  15  23.8  4  2.6  8  0.6  27.5
82  16  22.6  6  2.7  4  0.6  15.5
83  15  23.6  6  1.8  5  0.6  34.0
84  18  23.4  1  1.9  7  0.7  12.5
a.  One and two-bullock categories aggregated to  compute the  test
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0incorporating such  severe borrowing constraints also successfully predicts
the behavior  of the  large farmers,  we performed goodness-of-fit tests  using
the  information on this group  from the village from which we estimated the
profit  function reported in Table 4.  Because we only estimated a profit
function for large-size farms from a single village,  there are not enough
observations  to perform annual chi-square tests.  However, a cumulative test
over all of the years  reveals that  the model performs quite poorly in
predicting bullock stocks for this group.  When the actual lagged bullock
stock is  used the overall chi-square statistic is 21.7  and when the initial
(1975)  stock is used the statistic  is  102.  Interestingly, while  the model
underpredicts  the extent to which two bullocks  (the profit-maximizing level)
are owned in the case  of both small- and medium-size  farmers,  the model
significantly overpredicts the ownership of four bullocks  (the profit-
maximizing level)  in the case of large-size farms.  The poor performance of
our estimated model  in predicting the behavior of the  large-size farmers
based on the medium-size  farmer data suggests  that  the former may have
alternative means of consumption-smoothing, although it  is  notable that our
profit-function estimates suggest that  the  large farmers  are still not
"efficient" in their average holding of bullocks.
c.  Experimental  simulations based on the estimated parameters  :
policy effects
The structural parameter estimates, which appear  to provide  good fits
to  the actual data describing the mid-size farmers,  can be  used to  generate
the  effects of changes in the economic environment on the  life-cycle
accumulation of bullocks,  on profits and on consumption and welfare  for this
group.  Our profit  function estimates, obtained independently of the
structure of the behavioral model, imply that  there  is  considerable
24underinvestment  in bullocks, presumably due  to borrowing constraints.  It  is
therefore useful to  ascertain if  there  are  interventions, or circumstances,
that might induce or allow farmers  to hold more bullocks and thus  to
increase farmer efficiency apart from direct interventions  in credit
markets.  We consider four possible policies:  changes  (reductions and
increases)  in the price of bullocks,  the provision of weather-insurance  and
increases in opportunities for alternative  and assured income flows  for
farmers.
We perform the simulations by drawing 40 values of the idiosyncratic
profit shock, one for each age beginning at age  30,  from a (normal)
distribution characterized by the estimated profit variance.  These draws
are superimposed on weather  shocks, which are assumed to  occur once every
four years  (the sample probability is  .30) and to decrease profits by the
estimated amount reported in Table 4.  The age-specific profit draws  then
generate  life-cycle bullock purchases, sales and breeding decisions, solved
out from the model.  These experiments  are repeated 1000 times  and results
are averaged over all sets of draws by age.  The average values generated
thus correspond to what would be observed in the  aggregate  in an economic
environment experiencing a particular time-series of weather draws  and in
which 1000 farmers,  all of  the  same age,  also experienced uncorrelated
profit shocks.
Figure 5 reports  the average life-cycle accumulation of bullock stocks
generated by model simulations  for  initial bullock stocks of none,  one and
two.  The large paralleled spikes in the  three line-plots reflect the
effects  of the quadrennial weather shocks on bullock holdings.  The  most
important feature of Figure  5, however,  is  that initial conditions do not
matter much.  Farmers who begin with the profit-maximizing  level of  two
25bullocks, on average  sell off bullocks initially prior to  the first bad
weather draw, reflecting their desire  to  smooth consumption and the
necessity of achieving the consumption floor.  That is,  farmers already
holding two bullocks and with good draws do not buy additional bullocks,
because of their unprofitability, while such farmers experiencing bad shocks
sell some of their bullocks.  Farmers beginning with no bullocks  on net
purchase bullocks prior to  the  first bad weather year, reflecting the
perceived profitability of bullocks as  production factors.  After  the  first
bad-weather year bullocks  are accumulated on average by all  three  types of
farmers,  a consequence in part of  the rise  in farmer  incomes  due  to  age
effects and the accumulation of pumps.  However, on average, bullock stocks
never reach the profit-maximizing level of two bullocks  even for farmers who
begin their life with two bullocks.  In subsequent simulation experiments
we set  initial bullock stocks at one,  reflecting the approximate sample
average  for the middle-level farmers.
To ascertain the extent  to which bullock sales and purchases contribute
to consumption-smoothing we examine profit and consumption  levels.  In order
to isolate  the  influence of optimal bullock turnover from  the effect of
having an "insured" consumption floor, we generated a truncated set of
profit draws  such that no farmer's profits dip below the  consumption floor.
Figure 6 presents the  resulting average life-cycle movements  in profits,
consumption and the values  (at the  sample price of 962 rupees)  of the
bullock stocks.  Again, the regular  large spikes  in profits  reflect the
assumed four-year cycle of bad weather.  As  can be seen, however, the
movements  in consumption are always  less than those in profits, with
considerable  savings (net purchase of bullocks)  in  "good" weather years  and
dissaving (net sales of bullocks)  in eight of  the nine  "bad" years.  An
26-)































































C C)interesting feature of Figure  6 is  that  the amplitude  of fluctuations in
consumption increases relative  to  that in profits over  the  life-cycle.  As
the  mean level of profits  increases,  due to  age effects  on profitability and
to  the accumulation of pumps,  farmers  are evidently more willing to absorb
fluctuations  in consumption.  This  reflects declining absolute risk aversion
implied by the constant relative  risk aversion specification of the utility
function (12).
1.  Bullock Price Effects
Figure 7 displays  the  life-cycle accumulation of stocks  of bullocks
associated with the observed sample price and with bullock prices  set at  50
percent above and below the  observed price.  Figure 8 displays  the
corresponding paths of consumption.  These simulations  indicate  the
following:  First, reductions  in the price of bullocks  increase bullock
ownership in the  initial period of the life-cycle but lower them, relative
to that associated with the baseline  or actual price, after age 45.  Average
bullock stocks over the entire  life-cycle period actually decline  (by 2.4
percent)  in response  to  a permanent decrease  (by 50 percent)  in the price  of
bullocks.  Conversely, bullock stocks  are lower  initially when the price  of
bullocks  is  raised above  the  baseline but then  rise above baseline stocks;
however, average bullock stocks are  also lower compared to  the baseline
case, by 4.2 percent.
The differences  in the life-cycle  effects of price changes reflect  the
operation of borrowing constraints.  When income  is  relatively low, at  the
younger  ages, a  reduction in  the price of bullocks permits more farmers  to
accumulate bullocks,  as  expected.  However, a farmer experiencing a bad
shock to profits must sell more bullocks under a  lower-price regime;  when
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U)Icommon bad shock.  As  incomes  rise,  more farmers  are able  to purchase
bullocks under the high-price regime, and under the high-price  regime fewer
stock out during bad times.  After an initial disadvantage, therefore,
bullocks accumulate  at a faster rate when bullock prices  are high.  In part
this  is  also due  to  the  increased profitability of breeding bullocks when
bullock prices rise.  Indeed, in the high bullock-price  regime, on average
5.7 percent of farmers hold more  than two bullocks  (almost ten percent for
farmers over 45)  even though it  is  unprofitable  (in  the static sense)  to  do
so,  reflecting the greater value of bullocks as  a consumption-smoothing
asset.  In the lower-price regime, no  farmers ever hold more than two
bullocks.
The  increased affordability of bullocks engendered by a decrease  in
their price  is  evidently dominated by the  loss  to  farmers  due  to  the
decreased value of bullocks as consumption-smoothing assets--  expected
discounted utility  is  lower under the lower-price regime compared to  the
baseline.  Expected utility  is also  lower under the higher price-regime
compared to  the baseline because of  farmer's lessened ability to purchase
bullocks early in their life-cycle.  These results  thus  suggest  that  (i)
reductions  in the price  of bullocks do not necessarily improve welfare,
increase bullock ownership or profits,  although they may do  so  for poorer
farmers for whom the  problem of affordability, given borrowing constraints,
dominates and (ii)  increases  in the price  of bullocks may benefit higher-
profit farmers, who hold more bullocks on average, because of  the  rise  in
the value of their productive assets.  Our estimates  suggest, however, that
changes  in the market values or price  of bullocks by as much as  50 percent
in either direction only marginally alters average bullock holdings, which
remain at  levels, on average,  26  percent below profit-maximizing levels,
28even at the peak of the  life-cycle.
2.  Weather Insurance
The preceding simulations  illustrate  that the  accumulation of bullocks
is  substantially impeded by the presence of weather shocks, which induce
farmers  to  sell off bullocks in  order to  meet their consumption goals  (or
necessities).  It might appear, therefore,  that the provision of weather
insurance, by smoothing income, might lead  to  increased holdings of bullocks
and to  welfare gains.  Figures q  and 10 display the  effects  of providing
farmers with actuarially-fair weather insurance  on the  life-cycle
accumulation of bullocks and pumpsets and on life-cycle consumption  . The
actuarially-fair premium  is calculated as one-fourth of  the estimated profit
loss due to bad weather, which occurs one-fourth of the  time  (in this  case
every four years).  Farmers  thus pay 400 rupees  each year in return for a
smoother  income path.  The  figures  indicate that the paths of both bullock
stocks and consumption lose their weather-induced jaggedness, as  expected.
However, average bullock stocks and average consumption levels are lower
when farmers pay the  full cost of weather insurance,  due to  their having
lower incomes net of  the premium.
The decrease  in the variability of income  associated with weather
insurance yields a welfare gain, given our finding that  farmers are  risk-
averse.  However, our  estimates  indicate that  discounted expected utility is
no higher when farmers pay actuarially-fair  insurance premiums compared to
the baseline regime without  insurance.  The principle reason  is  that farmers
are already  in part insured via the consumption  floor.  The consumption-
floor, which reflects farmers'  informal  insurance arrangements via transfers
and which also exacts  a penalty  in terms  of bullock sales,  evidently is
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II·insurances,  fully paid for by the  farmers themselves,  thus  does not raise
average bullock holdings or profits  gross  of  insurance premiums and also
does not evidently improve farmer welfare, giving existing arrangements.
Thus our model and estimates explain the  absence  of weather  insurance.5
3.  Assured Income Opportunities
Our results  are consistent with the  hypothesis that borrowing
constraints combined with low and fluctuating incomes  are  the primary
reasons for underinvestment  in bullocks, and neither alterations  in the
price  of bullocks nor  the  provision of weather insurance are  evidently
effective  in improving farmer profitability or welfare.  If low incomes are
the  cause of lower profitability,  then improvements  in earnings,  from
whatever source,  should increase  efficiency by permitting  farmers  to
accumulate higher  capital stocks.  In Figure  11 we  present the results of
simulations  in which we provide  farmers with a constant 1000-rupee  income
stream.  We compare average bullock accumulations under this regime with
those of the empirical baseline and with a regime under which farmers  are
provided weather  insurance at no cost,  equivalent to a 400-rupee  increase in
annual profits but with no weather-induced shocks  to profits.
The  importance of income and thus borrowing constraints are visible  in
Figure  11.  By age  50,  farmers are  on average holding bullock stocks that
are within five percent of  the profit-maximizing  level of  two,  compared to
the baseline in which at age  50  average bullock stocks are only  58  percent
of the profit-maximizing  level.  Not surprisingly, the  subsidized weather
insurance  schemes raises bullock stocks  to  a point  intermediate to  the  1000-
rupee  supplement and the baseline.  What is  of  interest is  that  the
fluctuations in bullock stocks after age  50  in the  supplemental income case
are almost as  low as  those exhibited under the  weather insurance  regime.
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cu O)With higher  (non-agricultural) incomes,  farmers are both  able to  "afford"
higher profits and, because of declining absolute risk aversion, more
willing to  maintain farm profitability  at the  expense of  fluctuations  in
consumption.  These  results  imply therefore that increasing opportunities
for farm households  to  obtain jobs which pay assured salaries may also
increase agricultural investments  and the efficiency and profitability of
agricultural operations.6
4.  Conclusion
In rural settings  in which there are  important constraints on
borrowing, agricultural investment decisions presumably reflect households'
concern to  smooth consumption in the  face of exogenously-variable  incomes.
In this paper we have examined investments by Indian farm households  in one
of the most  important production factors  in that area of  the world,
bullocks.  These farm assets are not only central to production in the
monsoon agricultural economy of India, but appear to  serve  an important role
in smoothing consumption.  Data from a number of sources  indicates that
sales  of bullocks  increase significantly where weather outcomes  are poor,
and hence incomes  are  low, and purchases of bullocks  increase when rainfall
is ample  and incomes  are above average,  in contrast  to  all  other productive
assets,  inclusive of land.  One consequence of this  consumption-smoothing
role of productive  assets is  that agricultural output and  incomes  are
autocorrelated, a feature that  is  ignored  in almost all models  of  savings
decisions purporting to  describe behavior in rural  areas of low-income
countries.
Based on longitudinal data from villages  located in the semi-arid
tropics of India, we have estimated the  parameters of a dynamic model of
investment in bullocks and irrigation equipment incorporating uncertainty in
31agricultural output and in which bullock accumulation via purchases  and
sales can be used to  smooth consumption.  Our estimates  of the  model
indicate  that farmers are substantially averse  to  risk.  Moreover, despite
the  importance of bullock ownership  in producing crops  efficiently and its
value in mitigating consumption volatility, the estimates  indicate  that
there  is  considerable underinvestment  in bullocks.  Farmers'  aversion to
risk combined with borrowing constraints  thus  not only result in output
losses and lower incomes but also  exacerbate the volatility in incomes.
Simulations of the estimated model, which appeared to provide a
reasonable  fit to  life-cycle data on bullock accumulations, suggested that
(i) alterations in the price of bullocks, ceteris paribus,  change the  life-
cycle  pattern of bullock accumulations and alter the distribution of bullock
holdings  across land classes but do not significantly change average
holdings  of bullocks,  (ii)  the provision of actuarially-fair weather
insurance would, at least  in the environment for which we have data, have no
effect on farmer welfare,  in part because of farmers' evident ability to
insure a minimal  level of consumption via informal arrangements, and  (iii)
increases  in opportunities  for farm households  to have assured streams  of
income have a substantial positive effect on agricultural production
efficiency and output.  The low  level and uncertainty of  incomes,  in  the
presence of borrowing constraints, thus appear  to be  a principal cause  of
underinvestment and hence agricultural inefficiency.
The model estimated was parsimoniously parameterized in order to
maintain computational tractability while allowing for  the complexity of
dynamic decisions under a regime  of uncertainty.  Two important simplifying
assumptions  employed were the quasi-separability of production and the
absence of alternative  choices with regard to  assets.  With respect to  the
32latter, we treated  the  support of a minimal consumption level  as  an
estimable parameter.  While there  is  evidence of the  informal,  insurance-
based transfer arrangements  that correspond to  such a parameterization,
alternative risk-mitigating mechanisms  for achieving farmer production and
consumption objectives  should be modeled as  choices.  In this  regard, it may
be feasible to  incorporate contractual choice within the discrete choice
framework.7  For households who  are  "stocked out" with respect to  bullocks,
given the technological  infeasibility of leasing bullocks, a superior
alternative to own cultivation  is  to lease out  their land, presumably to
farmers with ready supplies of animal  traction.  A model of  tenurial
arrangements incorporating productive asset  accumulation could be useful in
explaining such phenomena as  sharecropping and the  "tenancy ladder" as  well
as life-cycle patterns of investments.  Finally, given the possibility of
estimating parameters describing both the technology  of production and
preferences,  it may be feasible  to  estimate an equilibrium model of the
bullock market, given aggregate  data on farmer age distributions  and asset
holdings by age.  Such a model would permit the assessment of  the  full
consequences of various policy interventions.
33Footnotes
1.  Most  tests of the presence of liquidity constraints have  involved the
search for violations of the conditions  implied by models incorporating the
assumption of complete markets and not the explicit modeling of consumption
or savings decisions when this assumption does not hold.  See Hayashi  (1987)
for a review of such studies, and Zeldes  (1989) for a recent example.
2.  Implementations  of dynamic, discrete  choice models include Miller
(1984),  Pakes  (1987),  Rust  (1987) and Wolpin (1984).  See Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989)  for further examples.
3.  For a comprehensive discussion of the  role of bullocks  in the Indian
economy, see Vaidyanathan (1988).
4.  These policy experiments are ceteris paribus experiments;  they do not
trace out the  full consequences of each intervention.  For example, it is
unlikely that a policy-induced change in the price of bullocks will not
affect the price of pumps or informal  insurance arrangements.  Our
experiments hold fixed all  other prices, however.
5.  Note that this result, that weather insurance provides no welfare  gain
conditional on the existence of  informal arrangements, does not imply  that
weather insurance  is  inferior  to  such arrangements.  Our model does not
include  the set-up costs  or charges associated with the  informal transfer
system, nor does  the insurance premium reflect administrative costs.  Such
costs  must be known before global  comparisons of alternative mechanisms  for
achieving income security can be made.
6.  This assumes  that labor markets operate efficiently and that  family and
hired labor  are perfect substitutes.  Evidence supporting these propositions
is  found in Pitt and Rosenzweig (1987)  and Benjamin (1988).
347.  Modeling  the  accumulation of financial assets may be  more difficult,
and not only because  of the  range of alternative values of this  variable.
The within-year periodicity of receipts  in agricultural  settings and the
need to  smooth consumption over the  crop cycle clearly would affect
financial asset holdings  and would have  to  also be  incorporated in the
model.
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